The NBC Symphony Orchestra’s 1940 South American Tour: Toscanini and the Good Neighbor Policy

The NBC Symphony’s 1940 tour of the east coast of South America was significant for at least two reasons. First, it was the first large-scale tour of the so-called “Toscanini Orchestra,” an ensemble created for the famous Italian conductor Arturo Toscanini in 1937 to lure him out of retirement to conduct radio concerts. Before the 1940 tour, the NBC Symphony had only performed eleven times outside the broadcast studio 8-H in Rockefeller Center. Second, the tour is important because it was one of the first major tours of a U.S. musical group to Latin America during what has come to be called the Good Neighbor era. Although the Good Neighbor era had begun in the early 1930’s, the cultural-exchange wing became most active in the early 1940’s. The 1940 tour of the NBC Symphony Orchestra coincided with the beginning of the peak years of U.S. interest in Latin America.

Today, both Toscanini and the Good Neighbor era have come under attack. Arturo Toscanini (1867–1957), once thought to embody U.S. aspirations to high culture, now is viewed in very much the opposite guise. His autocratic personality, ferocious displays of temper in rehearsals, erratic tempos, and his taste in repertoire—which seemed to have stopped expanding after about World War I—are viewed with much less indulgence today than in the first half of the twentieth century. Even more troubling to today’s cultural historians is the hype surrounding Toscanini, the hyperbolic claims of his divine
musicianship by newspaper critics and his handlers at NBC and NBC’s parent corporation, RCA, which also owned Toscanini’s record label, RCA-Victor. Some historians contend that Toscanini’s position as cultural icon and media star directly contributed to a late-twentieth-century crisis in classical music.¹

The Good Neighbor Policy has also undergone reassessment. The U.S. desire for friendlier relations with the nations of Latin America during the 1930’s and 1940’s, after decades of armed intervention and other kinds of political interference, is now looked upon with suspicion, especially since the United States essentially returned to its interventionist posture during the Cold War. Indeed, many historians doubt the U.S. government’s peaceful intentions during this era altogether. “In the name of nonintervention,” writes Peter H. Smith, “the Good Neighbor policy constituted yet another attempt to achieve, impose, and consolidate American supremacy.”² The same applies to cultural climate of this era. The number of motion pictures produced in Hollywood with Latin American themes and locales increased greatly during the 1930’s and 1940’s, but most films perpetuated the myths and stereotypes that have marred Hollywood representation of Latinos since the beginning of the U.S. film industry. Most cultural historians view Hollywood’s interest in Latin America during the Good Neighbor era, at best, as an attempt to soften up Latin American resistance to U.S. domination of its movie market at a time when European and Asian markets were closing due to World War II. At worst, the Good Neighbor era is seen as an insidious form of cultural imperialism.³

How does the 1940 NBC Symphony tour fit into this new view of the era? Was it a genuine gesture of international friendship or a front for cultural and political domination of South America? Like most history, the answer is mixed.

* * *

From the perspective of the orchestra and the radio network that owned it, the tour was an unmitigated success. The trip began on the first of June, 1940, when Toscanini and the
NBC Symphony Orchestra set sail aboard the *S. S. Brazil* for their seven-week tour. On board were Toscanini, his wife Carla, and their grandson Walfredo; the orchestra players and several of their wives; plus the orchestra librarian, a baggage master, and a handful of NBC officials, including NBC vice president John Royal and RCA Chairman David Sarnoff and his wife and son Robert. There was a tremendous party as the ship prepared to leave the port, and it took more than a half hour to get the well-wishers down the gangplank so the ship could depart.

The two-week journey to Rio was a pleasant experience for everyone. NBC Symphony bassoonist Leonard Sharrow recalls:

> The trip was marvelous on the way down. . . . We were about twelve days at sea; leaving New York we were in tropical waters in a day or two. We spent all our time in the pool, eating all our meals on the deck—it was great. And Toscanini was up on deck with all of us. We could get close to him, talk to him.

An enormous crowd greeted Toscanini and the orchestra at the dock in Rio.

Since all the cities on the tour were ports, the orchestra traveled by ship: Rio de Janeiro on 12 and 13 June; São Paulo on 14 June; Buenos Aires on 18, 20, 22, 24, 27, 29 and 30 June and 2 July; Montevideo on 3 and 4 July; returning to São Paulo on 8 July, and back to Rio on 9 and 10 July. The orchestra’s first concert was greeted with “thunderous” applause. “Rarely has an artist received such an impetuous, almost frenzied, reception as Toscanini got on his return to Rio de Janeiro this year,” wrote Lisa Peppercorn of the *New York Times*. The *Jornal do Brasil* referred to the NBC Symphony as “the most perfect orchestra in the world, comprised of professors who are true ‘virtuosi’ of their instruments.” A reviewer in the *Jornal do Comercio* referred to the “exceptional merit of the orchestra: dense, transparent, brilliant; [with] every gradation in the intensity scale,” and observed that Toscanini’s gestures were “not very exuberant for
a Latin, especially for an Italian,” but that their beauty and elegance left a powerful imprint.\textsuperscript{10} The next stop was São Paulo, where NBC cellist Alan Shulman remembers that all the box seats were empty because the upper class was pro-Mussolini. “But the rest of the house went crazy,” he said.\textsuperscript{11}

Toscanini and the NBC Symphony garnered headlines and rave notices all down the east coast of South America. Toscanini received a “delirious standing ovation” at his first concert in Buenos Aires, and filled the famous Teatro Colón past capacity every night.\textsuperscript{12} According to one review, however, the high point of the tour was the orchestra’s stay in Montevideo:

The largest audience ever packed into Uruguay’s State-operated Soder Theatre went wild this afternoon in its efforts to express its enthusiasm for the concert Arturo Toscanini conducted with the NBC Orchestra. . . . This afternoon’s huge audience sat intensely interested throughout Toscanini’s superb interpretation of Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony and then its pent-up emotion gave way to a spontaneous shout and prolonged cheering.

Another outburst of cheering was given at the termination of Paganini’s “Perpetual Motion.” After selections from Rossini, Mendelssohn, Smetana and Weber, Toscanini concluded the program with his internationally famous interpretation of Debussy’s “La Mer,” after which the audience jumped to its feet and cheered for nearly ten minutes. The conductor, after taking repeated curtain calls without diminishing applause, finally clapped his hands to his ears and ran off the stage, waving a final farewell from the wings.\textsuperscript{13}

The next day, the Fourth of July, Toscanini called a rehearsal at 11:00 as usual, conducted a single, energetic version of the Star-Spangled Banner in an empty theater and sent the players home until the concert.\textsuperscript{14}
More than two thousand Montevideo locals stood in the rain and fog for six hours to try to obtain standing-room tickets to that night’s concert. The program that night was typical of Toscanini: Beethoven’s *Egmont* Overture, Brahms’s Second Symphony, Respighi’s *Fontane di Roma*, the Prelude and *Liebestod* from *Tristan und Isolde*, and the prelude to *Die Meistersinger*. A reviewer from the *New York Times* reported:

When the program was ended the audience arose and applauded without interruption for fifteen minutes. During the last five minutes of this period Toscanini’s name was chanted in unison.

Hundreds stood in the rain at the theatre entrance, at the hotel and at the port to applaud the conductor as he passed. The NBC executives who have accompanied Toscanini on the trip said nothing in other cities approached the enthusiasm accorded here.\(^{15}\)

One might note that this Independence Day concert contained nothing in the way of works by U.S. composers. Indeed, on the entire tour only one North American piece was performed, Samuel Barber’s *Adagio for Strings*, which Toscanini and the NBC Symphony had premiered two years previously—and even this piece was performed only once on the tour. This lack of programming of American music was a major element of the criticism of Toscanini during his lifetime, and remains so today.\(^{16}\) On the tour’s repertoire list (see Appendix), however, in addition to the standard Toscanini concert fare of Beethoven, Brahms and Wagner, one does find several South American composers: Argentineans Julián Aguirre (1868–1924) and Alberto Williams (1862–1952), and Brazilians Oscar Lorenzo Fernández (1897–1948), Carlos Gomes (1836–1896), and Francisco Mignone (1897–1986). In the case of Mignone—whose father was an Italian immigrant to Brazil—Toscanini became something of a champion, programming his works several times after the tour, including a memorable NBC Symphony performance of Mignone’s symphonic impression *Festa das igrejas* in 1944 which provided the
composer with some international attention. Toscanini also helped arranged for Mignone
to conduct the NBC Symphony when the composer visited New York in 1942.
Nevertheless, Toscanini’s lack of U.S. music on his programs left some South American
listeners puzzled.17

The day after the Fourth-of-July concert, the orchestra boarded the S. S. Uruguay
for the last leg of the journey, back to São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The group
performed in São Paulo on 8 July and in Rio the next two nights, and then immediately
boarded the Uruguay to begin the voyage home.18

Tragedy struck on the last day of the tour. On his way to the orchestra’s last
concert, one of the viola players, 56-year-old Jacques Tushinsky, was struck by a bus in
the streets of Rio and died that same day. Leonard Sharrow recalls:

Nobody had said anything to the Old Man, no one told him about it. But
we felt at some time or other, somebody had better tell him, because sure
enough, the press is going to meet the boat at the dock when it comes in,
and interview Toscanini, and ask him about this particular thing. And it
will look very bad if he didn’t know. So somebody, I don’t know who it
was—somebody close to him, I guess—had the burden of telling him what
had happened. And it broke him up completely.

He had planned a big party on shipboard for the orchestra; that was
all canceled—nothing. After a tour, he always used to have a party out at
his house, and he’d table-hop, making sure everybody was having a good
time. But this time it cast a pall over everything, understandably so.19

The orchestra put together a fund for Tushinsky’s widow and family, and Toscanini
contributed $1,000. Back in New York, NBC received several notes of condolence from
the company’s new associates in South America, and the network also donated $1,000 to
the family. NBC officials attended his funeral on 6 August 1940.20
The players, meanwhile, knew that life is for the living. According to the *New York Times*,

Other passengers said that the orchestra members had been like youths on a picnic, on the voyage home, and that their appetites had astonished passenger and crew alike.

“It was marvelous and amazing,” said a member of the crew. “We would lay out a big spread and here would come the orchestra, and they would sweep over it like the stories you’ve read of locusts. Nothing would remain.”

The ship’s supply of soft drinks and beer ran out several days before the liner reached New York, they said.21

There was no denying the tour’s immense success. Toscanini’s satisfaction was made obvious in a sentimental letter which was read aloud to the players after the tour. “We have never been so linked, so all-one, as in these sixteen concerts,” he wrote.22 NBC was also pleased, as much with the publicity as the art.23 The U.S. South American ambassadors showered the network with letters of praise. Norman Armour, Ambassador to Argentina, proudly referred to the NBC Symphony as “the United States’ fifth column.”24 The *Times* summarized the undertaking as “one of the most elaborate good-will gestures made toward South American countries in recent years.”25

* * *

In the archives of the National Broadcasting Company, now held at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, the first mention of a possible tour to South America appears in a memo from NBC vice president John Royal to an RCA-Victor executive stationed in Buenos Aires, dated from May 1939:

Confidentially, do you know Mr. Norbert A. Bogden, . . . Avenide Roque Saenz Pena 567, Buenos Aires? Who is he, and what is his background
and responsibility? He has been writing to us about bringing Toscanini and the symphony orchestra to Buenos Aires. It is an interesting proposal, but we don’t know anything about the man. We would prefer that nothing be said about this until you give us more information.26

Although Royal corresponded with Bogden for a time, NBC’s interest soon shifted to the general director of the Colón Theater in Buenos Aires, Fioro Ugarte. This is revealed by a New York Times article from January, 1940, describing a visit Ugarte was making to New York:

Mr. Ugarte is a man of aspiration. One of the things he would like to do while he is here is to induce Arturo Toscanini to bring the National Broadcasting Company Symphony Orchestra to South America during the Summer season. At this writing negotiations have not even been opened, and the outcome is anybody’s guess.27

Ugarte had been making several trips to the United States at this time to scout out talent; like many concert promoters in the Western Hemisphere, he had found himself short on talent after the start of the war. A tour by the NBC Symphony was as much needed by South American concert promoters as it was by NBC.

Why would NBC need to make such an expensive tour? There were several reasons, not the least of which was related to its commercial interests. In the 1930’s and early 1940’s Latin America was seen as the primary region for growth in the radio market. NBC’s interest in the region was made up of equal parts patriotism and capitalism; it competed in Latin America not just with its rival radio network CBS but also with radio broadcasts sponsored by the fascist governments of Europe. The Third Reich had installed several new transmitters in 1934 and begun broadcasting four hours daily to South America, a number which rose to sixteen by 1939.28 It was this move by Germany that pressured radio interests in Great Britain and the United States to increase their radio presence in South America.29 “Brazil is being used as a football field,” wrote
Frank Garcia of the New York Times in 1938. “The players are the nations of Europe and the ball in use is the radio-broadcast ball kicked here and there, more strongly by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, with Japan looking over the wall ready to jump in.”

Unlike the European nations, the U.S. radio market was commercial, not government supported. Still, commercial broadcasters in America knew they had to fulfill the State Department’s need to compete with Axis propaganda or else the government might establish its own powerful station—and any hint of Federal intrusion into American broadcasting was seen as a threat to the lucrative commercial broadcasting system then unique to the United States. In November 1936 John Royal took a long business trip to South America to generate “closer radio affiliations with our South American neighbors” and to prepare “for a more extensive broadcast service to South America.” NBC quickly announced a new agreement to augment its South American network by allowing local stations there to rebroadcast NBC’s short-wave signals. NBC soon put into production several new programs such as The Hemisphere Review and Good Neighbors, “a series of dramatized human interest programs built around the various Central and South American countries.” CBS, meanwhile, created the most extensive network of short-wave and long-wave stations to date, La Cadena de las Americas (The Network of the Americas), which began transmission in 1942. The U.S. government helped the situation by expediting FCC approval for upgrading twelve commercial short-wave stations to 50,000 watts and by providing the content of a news service. The financial burden, however, rested on the networks and a handful of independent commercial stations. American broadcasters hoped that these Latin-American short-wave networks would become major commercial ventures after the war, but advertisers never materialized.

The fact that Toscanini was the conductor of the NBC Symphony also played a role in the decision to send the orchestra to South America. To many Americans, Toscanini was more than just a conductor: he was an icon of cultural authority, a symbol of the
nation’s progress from Gilded-Age commercialism to a level of sophistication to rival Europe’s. Sending our European-born symbol of high culture to Latin America was a kind of self-congratulation. Even more important for this proposed tour was Toscanini’s steadfast anti-fascism. Although he had supported Mussolini early on, as soon as Mussolini revealed his totalitarian ambitions, Toscanini became one Mussolini’s most vocal opponents. Toscanini barely escaped from Italy in the summer of 1938 after he was overheard on a tapped telephone line criticizing Mussolini’s anti-Semitic policy. Toscanini’s opposition was a public-relations fiasco for Mussolini. NBC’s sending Toscanini to Brazil and Argentina, where there was a sizable Italian population, was a subtle form of anti-fascist propaganda.

There was also a sentimental reason for a Toscanini tour. In 1940 the conductor was approaching the end of his contract with NBC—which was scheduled to run one more season—and with Toscanini, who turned 73 in 1940, the prospect of retirement was never far from his mind in these years. A capstone tour of South America would be a fitting end to his career, since it was in Rio de Janeiro that he had made his spectacular debut as a conductor in 1886.

At that time, Toscanini was touring South America as principal cellist in an Italian opera company. The Brazilian conductor for the tour turned out to be incompetent; but when the conductor agreed to submit his resignation, Brazilian national pride was wounded. The word on the streets in Rio was that there would be a riot at the performance of Aida that night. At the performance, when the Italian assistant conductor walked to the podium, instead of applauding the crowd roared its indignation. The police were called should a riot ensue. Try as he may, the new conductor could not placate the crowd; nor could he begin the performance because of the noise. Finally, one of the women in the chorus, who knew of Toscanini’s phenomenal musicianship, urged him to take over. Several singers joined in putting forward his name. Finally Toscanini, just nineteen years old at the time, picked up a baton and walked to the podium. Ignoring the
Meyer

violin part in front of him (which conductors often used instead of full scores in the nineteenth century) he began to conduct. Slowly, the audience quieted down. He conducted the whole of *Aida* from memory, as he did every other performance on that tour, and for the rest of his life—Toscanini had been forced to memorize his music due to severe myopia. The crowd’s roar of indignation became a roar of approbation at the end of the performance, and Toscanini was immediately appointed conductor of the tour. Within six weeks of this famous debut, he conducted twenty-six performances of eleven operas, all from memory. After this almost mythic beginning, many Latin Americans observed Toscanini’s meteoric career with a sense of avuncular pride. The 1940 tour was thus a kind of homecoming for Toscanini, possibly bookending the most spectacular conducting career of the era.

* * *

From the perspective of six decades, the luster of the NBC Symphony tour has faded somewhat. One issue has to do with the way the tour was organized. Throughout the preparations for the tour, NBC engaged in a strange shell game with finances. In both internal and external memos, vice president John Royal claimed the tour was operating “close to the line” and was in danger of losing money. It was true that the tour was expensive—Toscanini’s salary alone for the tour was $28,500, an enormous sum in 1940 dollars. And just three weeks before the tour was to begin, the musicians’ union suddenly tacked on an additional $14,000 in personnel charges and demanded that the orchestra be expanded from 95 to 100. “If it had come weeks ago we would have canceled the trip,” wrote Royal, “but now we are in a position where we must go through with it.” One of the five musicians added at the last minute was the ill-fated Jacques Tushinsky.

Yet Royal also had powerful business connections in place to grease the wheels of the tour’s machinery. Royal arranged for General Motors to include in its regular advertising in South America “a paragraph or two or welcome to Toscanini some time
near the dates of his concerts there.” Royal urged GM to think of other ways to link up with the tour, and the company supplied Toscanini with the use of a General Motors car while in Brazil.41

Through some negotiation that remains unrecorded, Royal also managed to convince the Moore-McCormack Line, proprietors of the S.S. Brazil and the S.S. Uruguay, to transport the orchestra and equipment for half the normal cost ($35,000 instead of $70,000). The only record of this negotiation is one confidential letter, from Royal to Robert C. Lee of Moore-McCormack: “I just want to ask you to consider any further help which you might give us, and which would be greatly appreciated, and I can assure you that we would endeavor to reciprocate whenever possible.” One form of this reciprocation might be indicated by a letter from Royal to Lee a few days earlier: “Thought you might be interested in the announcement we made on the air Saturday night during the Toscanini-symphony program.”42 The tone of this memo implies that free advertisement was given to Moore-McCormack during an NBC Symphony program, perhaps in favor for a discount already given. Indeed, the New York Times estimated the cost of transportation to be $200,000, numbers probably supplied by NBC.43 The ship line was later attacked by a rival orchestra for giving the Toscanini gang an unfair price—an accusation hotly denied by the line’s president.44 We will return to this rival orchestra in a moment.

Another tour management issue has to do with concert promoting. NBC assumed none of the cost for promoting the South American concerts, leaving it up to the local concert managers. But when Fioro Ugarte sought to broadcast the orchestra’s Rio concerts in Buenos Aires as a kind of preview, he raised Royal’s ire. “This is a franchise we cannot give up without payment,” Royal warned.45 Ugarte then attempted to arrange to broadcast the Buenos Aires concerts instead, which made Royal even madder:
We made it quite plain to you that we were figuring very close on our expense, and had considered the revenues from radio broadcasting in Buenos Aires as a necessary part of our budget. You have decided to ignore this phase of the matter, and I want you to know that we are disappointed in your attitude.\textsuperscript{46}

The broadcast rights were eventually sold to Standard Oil.

In the end, NBC suffered only a modest loss of about $9,000 for the trip, and this loss was mostly due to another surprise assessment from the musicians’ union—this one for gratuities spent by the musicians on board the ships—and for the costs associated with the death of Tushinsky, including the donation of $1,000 to his family. “I would like to suggest that these figures be kept as confidential as possible,” Royal suggested to a superior. “If the Union estimates that we lost $50,000 on the tour, I think it is better to have it remain that way.”\textsuperscript{47}

NBC’s dealings with a rival orchestra, also planning a tour of Latin America, also reveal some of the machinations of the network. The rivalry began on December 2, 1939, when the \textit{New York Herald-Tribune} announced on the front page that the flamboyant conductor Leopold Stokowski was planning a trip to South America with a hand-picked youth orchestra the following summer. The announcement caught Royal by surprise: “In view of our telephone conversation the other day, what is there to this Stokowski business as per the attached?” he wrote to a colleague at NBC. “I hope he doesn’t beat us on this.”\textsuperscript{48} What followed then was an intense competition between the two organizations. In February of 1940, the \textit{New York Times} reported that both tours were depending on support from the same sources, the governments and certain business leaders of South America. Since “such support, if it materializes, will go only to one orchestra . . . it will be impossible to raise funds to send both conductors and their ensembles on tour.”\textsuperscript{49} NBC possessed a distinct advantage in organization, and before long the Stokowski troupe began to sound desperate. In April, Mrs. Samuel Lyle Connor, the chair of the executive
committee of Stokowski’s All-American Youth Orchestra, accused NBC of trying to “cash in” on Stokowski’s idea. In a statement probably originating from Stokowski, she attacked the notion that Toscanini would be a good representative of the United States. “Toscanini represents the money which NBC spends on publicity. . . . He stands for no part of the culture of this country and in all his thirty-odd years here he has played no more than three pieces of our symphonic music.”

This accusation that NBC stole the idea of a South American tour from Stokowski has had a long currency. Stokowski’s biographer Oliver Daniel wrote in the 1980’s, “Frankly, I know of no more viciously reprehensible act than that of the scheduling of the NBC Symphony’s tour directly before that of the All-American Youth Orchestra under Stokowski.” NBC may have played hardball in the planning of their tour, but the evidence of the NBC Archives does not support this accusation. NBC was planning its tour—including the timing of it—months before it heard of Stokowski’s plans.

In the end, both orchestras went, and both were successful. The All-American Youth Orchestra’s tour was somewhat longer—22 concerts, compared to 16—and included a stop in the Dominican Republic. Stokowski also made a greater effort than Toscanini to be a cultural ambassador, issuing statements about good neighborliness and making recordings of Latin American folk music along the way. Even though the NBC Symphony tour had ended by the time Stokowski’s was underway, the rivalry continued. Royal seems to have asked for reports on the Stokowski tour from his contacts in South America, who knew this meant he was digging for dirt. One of his colleagues in Buenos Aires wrote:

Between us, I can tell you that nothing has succeeded in surpassing the memory which cannot be erased, of the performance of the great Toscanini and his marvelous orchestra. The tour has been, without any doubt, the most outstanding, significant event of the year 1940. That was
made clear once again on the occasion of Stokowski’s debut. This musician, although a great deal of publicity surrounded him, has not succeeded for one moment in making us forget the concerts from the Colon.\textsuperscript{53}

Others wrote about Stokowski’s difficulty in selling out his concerts and an embarrassing flap when Stokowski delayed the start of a concert so that ushers could collect from the audience all the programs, which supposedly contained misinformation in his biography.\textsuperscript{54} The negative reports Royal received do not correspond to the reviews of the Stokowski tour in the newspapers, which told of universal acclaim for Stokowski and his youth orchestra.\textsuperscript{55}

* * *

Our memory of the NBC Symphony tour—indeed, of all the cultural exchange efforts of this period—is also tarnished by the current reassessment of the Good Neighbor era. Probably the most memorable result of the Good Neighbor era came through the lens of Hollywood, which developed a sudden interest in Latin-American themes and locales during this period. While Hollywood certainly improved its image of the Latino in the 1930’s—it had ample room for improvement from silent-era films such as \textit{Tony the Greaser} and \textit{The Greaser’s Revenge}—most of the Hollywood movies of the 1930’s and early 1940’s essentially perpetuated the pervading Latino stereotypes. Latin-American male characters—usually portrayed by U.S. actors of northern European descent—remained volatile outsiders with dark skin and bulging eyeballs.\textsuperscript{56} While Latinas were more likely to portray Latinas in leading roles, they still remained cast as the “other” in Hollywood films. Ana López states:

\begin{quote}
What Hollywood’s Good Neighbor regime demanded was the articulation of a different female star persona that could be readily identifiable as Latin American (with the sexual suggestiveness necessary to fit the prevailing stereotype) but whose sexuality was neither too attractive (to dispel the
fear-attraction of miscegenation) nor so powerful as to demand its submission to a conquering North American male.\textsuperscript{57}

The most famous Latina star of the era was Carmen Miranda (1909–1955), referred to at the time as the “Brazilian Bombshell,” with her trademark flashing eyes and fruited headdress. Miranda, an enormously talented singer and comedian, was never able to break out of her two-dimensional screen persona, and died tragically in her mid-forties.\textsuperscript{58}

These characterizations, along with factual and linguistic blunders (even in Hollywood’s Spanish-language films), led several Latin American countries to ban these films and to threaten to ban all future films made by the offending film companies.\textsuperscript{59} Partly out of concern for ramifications of these errors, the Roosevelt administration established in 1940 the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), led by a young Nelson Rockefeller, thirty-two, who had extensive business experience with South America.\textsuperscript{60} The CIAA was not just concerned about the Latin image in movies. Also included in its activities were the distribution of articles to magazines and newspapers throughout the hemisphere; the creation of its own magazine in Spanish and Portuguese, \textit{En Guardia}; the sponsorship of art exhibitions, musical concerts, and literary translations; and cooperation with U.S. radio networks to increase short-wave broadcasts and to provide technological help so that reception improved. The CIAA is best remembered for its work for the film industry, for which it funded documentaries and served as a kind of censor for films to be distributed in the Southern Hemisphere, insuring that the movies contained nothing that might be deemed insensitive to Latin Americans—and nothing that might unnecessarily impugn the U.S. government.\textsuperscript{61}

Through the auspices of the CIAA, the U.S. government sponsored dozens of propaganda films about American life, primarily for Latin American consumption: the Department of Agriculture’s \textit{Power and the Land}, about rural electrification; the Department of the Interior’s \textit{Boulder Dam and Hydro} and \textit{Steel, Man’s Servant}; The Office of War Information’s \textit{The Life of a Real Cowboy}.\textsuperscript{62} The motion picture division of
the CIAA, directed by John Jay Whitney, also provided funding for private filmmakers to make movies about Latin America for domestic consumption. The CIAA sent Walt Disney on a goodwill tour with Whitney and a small film crew in 1941, providing him with $100,000 to produce two films on South America, *Saludos Amigos* (1943) and *The Three Caballeros* (1945). Both movies utilized a new technique blending live action and animation, and featured Donald Duck and a new character, a Brazilian parrot named Joe Carioca. The CIAA was supposed to screen out culturally insensitive material, but Donald Duck’s lecherous ogling of Latin American women in *The Three Caballeros* managed to slip through. This scene offended even the U.S. audiences, and Disney withdrew the film from the public shortly after it opened.\(^6^3\)

The CIAA’s censorship sword could cut both ways, also insuring that no movie with a Latin-American theme would offend the reactionary elements of U.S. society. Perhaps the most famous of the CIAA-funded films was Orson Welles’ documentary *It’s All True*, shot primarily in Brazil in 1942. Welles, one of Hollywood’s leading liberals at the time, ran into constant trouble with both his studio, RKO, and the CIAA. According to Robert Stam, the CIAA recommended to RKO that the film “avoid any reference to miscegenation” and that Welles should “omit sequences of the film in which mulattos or mesticos appear conspicuously.” A member of film’s production team wrote back to RKO to warn of Welles’ “indiscriminate intermingling of blacks and whites.” RKO, meanwhile, worried about Welles’ reference to the heroes of one sequence in the film as Indians, a perspective that “will be impossible to sell to [the] audience, especially south of the Mason-Dixon line.” In the end, the film was never completed.\(^6^4\)

As gestures of goodwill, Hollywood’s movies from this era failed. According to Allen Woll, Latin American nations resented these so-called “Good Neighbor” films for two reasons:
First, they were annoyed by the misinterpretations of their culture which occurred frequently despite the plethora of technical advisors available to screenwriters. Brazilians were among the most sensitive, resenting any intimation that their nation possessed a substantial Indian population. . . . Second, Latin American critics resented the inter-American unity message which was clearly evident in each film. *Sintonia*, an Argentine weekly, argued that the “United States Goodwill Drive, via films, radio, and the press has taken on the characteristics of a spiritual blitzkrieg prepared in the arsenals of Yankee advertising.”

* * *

However bumbling and insulting the results of their efforts, Hollywood filmmakers had at least two genuine reasons for its Latin American focus: the growing interest on the part of U.S. citizens in Latin America, and the fear that one or more Latin American nation was about to be invaded or overthrown by Nazi or fascist forces. To be sure, Hollywood wanted access to Latin American film market, but it also believed that these friendlier films could simultaneously satisfy the curiosity of the domestic market and forge a kind of hemispheric bond that could help Latin-American citizens resist the enemy.

Although the coining of the phrase “Good Neighbor” can be attributed to president-elect Herbert Hoover in 1928, it was during the Roosevelt administration that the earnest gestures of goodwill began—along with deepening concern over the region. Part of the concern was purely economic, that U.S. business interests were being edged out of what they considered to be their market. Between 1933 and 1938 the German share of Brazilian imports climbed from 12 percent to 25 percent, while the German share of Brazilian exports grew from just over 8 percent to nearly 20 percent. Mexican trade with Germany jumped twelve percent in the first quarter of 1938 alone. The Third Reich’s economic plans for Latin America were devised not only to provide raw materials for the coming war but also to weaken trade between Latin America and other powerful nations, specifically Great Britain and the United States. Germany developed a system of
bartering with South American nations whereby Germany would purchase huge quantities of export items with “Aski” marks, which were good only for the purchases of German articles of export. With the increasing Nazi and Fascist economic hold over Europe and Japan’s over Asia, Latin America’s importance as U.S. trading partner grew. The Roosevelt administration addressed the challenge earnestly, forgiving loans, offering credit, and providing various kinds of assistance to Brazil, Nicaragua, Chile, Paraguay, and other nations.67

Underlying the American reaction to the economic penetration by Germany and Italy was another, more frightening prospect: that the Nazis were planning to invade Latin America in the near future. Scholars after the war, however, found no evidence in captured German archives that the Nazis planned a military invasion of Latin America.68

Indeed, many scholars now believe that FDR may have deliberately exaggerated the threat of Nazi invasion of the hemisphere in order to frighten an isolationist Congress into providing more support to Great Britain.69 Still, there was ample discussion of such plots during this time. In June of 1940 the New York Times reported a plan whereby German forces would land in southern Brazil, sweep through Uruguay, Paraguay and northern Argentina, and eventually conquer Chile:

It is explained that the occupation of these districts would give the Reich access to virtually all the raw materials it now needs, including metals and nitrates. Uruguay, Paraguay and Northern Argentina would supply meat, hides, wool, grains, linseed and timber in enormous quantities.

The Germans are boasting that they could successfully invade Argentina and Brazil with 20,000 men each. Under present conditions neither Uruguay nor Paraguay could offer any resistance against a couple of thousand modernly equipped troops. Since such an invasion would depend on a German victory in Europe, it is not believed to be imminent, though it is recognized that its potential danger is alarming.70
Perhaps German victory in Europe was not imminent, but more Americans at this time believed Germany would win the war than believed Great Britain would, and 70 percent believed the Nazis would invade South America if they were victorious in Europe. Several events in the early 1940’s contributed to this fear. In May of 1940, a Nazi uprising in Uruguay nearly toppled the government. The United States rushed two battleships to Montevideo, but the coup was averted primarily by an early warning provided by Brazil, as well as a massive Brazilian display of force at the border. In early 1941, Mexican officials announced the existence of a Nazi spy ring in that country, and promised to eradicate the menace. A similar discovery was made in Chile the following summer. Perhaps most dramatic of all, in October of 1941 President Roosevelt announced he had in his possession a “secret map” disclosing Nazi plans to weld Central and South America into five vassal states. German officials denied the rumor—as they did all these plots—and charged that Roosevelt had forged the map. Again, researchers after the war neither found such a map, nor any evidence that Germany directed the possible putsches in Latin America; they seem to have been independently engineered by local Nazis. “It can hardly be doubted, however,” writes historian Alton Frye, “that Berlin would have welcomed the success of the frustrated coups d’état.” The fact that no plans exist is no guarantee that Germany might not have decided later to launch just such an invasion; a case in point is the history of Russo-German relations at this very time. Hitler in fact privately discussed the eventual German domination of the United States several times, as well as his aim to transform Brazil from “a corrupt mestizo state into a German dominion.” Citizens of the Western Hemisphere had good reason to worry.

Although it is true that the Good Neighbor Policy had political causes, it was also part of a broader movement towards hemispheric convergence that is more than simply a cultural arm of U.S. economic and political domination. Fredrick B. Pike’s recent survey of the Good Neighbor Policy posits a long list of changes that occurred in the United
States that paved the way toward mutual understanding and alliance during the Roosevelt years. The most significant of these occurred with the advent of the Great Depression, which had the effect of bringing the economic level of the United States in closer alignment with Latin America. By the 1930’s, intellectuals in both North and South America shared a distrust of unfettered business interests. Roosevelt’s government, in both style and substance, also resembled the governments of Latin America more than that of any other president of the century. Pike thus sees the Good Neighbor Policy as a natural result of hemispheric convergence, rather than the reverse—a government policy meant to force convergence upon its southern neighbors.

Indeed, when we consider a subject close at hand—the cross-fertilization of U.S. and Latin-American music—the Good Neighbor era seems more like a bump in a long road rather than a detour. John Storm Roberts, in his history of Latin-American music styles in the United States, argues convincingly that U.S. popular styles, including jazz, country, and rock, were more deeply influenced by Latin music at their outset than has previously been acknowledged. U.S. interest in Latin music dates at least as far back as the early nineteenth century, when a habanera craze swept the nation, and the twentieth century U.S. popular music scene has been dotted with subsequent Latino dance crazes, among them the tango during the 1910’s and the rumba during the 1930’s. Not only does U.S. interest in Latin-American popular music predate the Good Neighbor era, unlike the interest of the film industry, it also postdates it, from Cubop and the Mambo in the late 1940’s and 1950’s, through bossa nova of the 1960’s, Latin Rock in the 1970’s, and the current wave of Latino music stars such as Ricky Martin. In terms of popular music the Good Neighbor years only yielded one new craze, the Samba, fueled in part by Carmen Miranda and the Disney films mentioned above.

The musical exchanges of the Good Neighbor era focused instead on classical music and folk music. The author of an article on “musical good neighborliness” in Recreation magazine suggested music lovers scour their cities for Latinos to make music
with. He continued, rather naively: “If, unlike Houston and Los Angeles, your community has no Latin-Americans to share their cultural resources with their neighbors . . . one or more capable ones might be ‘borrowed’ now and then from another community.”\textsuperscript{80} It was during this era that the Pan-American Union established a Music Division, focusing on the exchange of folk music in the Western Hemisphere, led by Charles Seeger.\textsuperscript{81} The CIAA also established a music division, headed by Carleton Sprague Smith, in order to foster musical pan-Americanism. In 1941, the office sent Aaron Copland on a goodwill tour of South America, where he made the acquaintance of composers Silvestre Revueltas, Alberto Ginastera, and Heitor Villa-Lobos, whose careers he subsequently promoted at home.\textsuperscript{82} Another friend of Copland’s, the Mexican composer-conductor Carlos Chavez, toured the United States successfully during this time, as did Villa-Lobos, and Chavez was guest conductor with, among other orchestras, the NBC Symphony in 1938. Likewise, U.S. and European conductors in exile in the United States turned to Latin America for guest-conducting opportunities.\textsuperscript{83} Perhaps the most lasting legacy of this era was the “Latinization” of some classical pieces, such as Copland’s \textit{El Salón México} (1937), George Gershwin’s \textit{Cuban Overture} (1932), and Morton Gould’s \textit{Latin American Symphonette} (1941).

\* \* \*

Ultimately, the Good Neighbor era probably left little of lasting cultural value, especially in the form of Hollywood films. The Latin-American impact on classical and folk music during this period was for the most part temporary, and proceeded in popular music irregardless of the particular circumstances surrounding the Good Neighbor policy. After the 1940 tour, Toscanini remained interested in South America, but NBC less so. Toscanini returned to Buenos Aires in the summer of 1941 for seven concerts with the Teatro Colón Orchestra, but when the NBC Symphony and Toscanini were invited to participate in a 1942 Cuban music festival, with the possibility of extending this new tour to Mexico, NBC refused.\textsuperscript{84} NBC’s Latin-American programming continued through
World War II, then stopped abruptly. When the opportunity arose for Villa Lobos to conduct the NBC Symphony in 1951, NBC rejected the offer. And throughout the preparation and aftermath of the tour, NBC’s questionable business dealings and unwarranted sense of competition with Stokowski leave the impression of a company primarily concerned with noncultural matters.

NBC’s interests, however, cannot be seen as entirely commercial. NBC may have been trying to penetrate the South American radio market, but sending its symphony cannot have been a wise financial strategy, since the concerts back home were sustaining programs—in other words, not sponsored. If Toscanini and the NBC Symphony were sent as advertisements for their concert programs, it was a losing proposition financially since it would cost NBC more to transmit the New York concerts to South America. A more accurate assessment would be that the orchestra was sent as a kind of ambassador for the network as a whole, with the hopes of spreading good feelings toward a potential radio chain in South America, yet to be built. If financial concerns were all there were to the tour, however, the money-obsessed NBC executives would surely have found a better way—and a better time, such as when the proposed network was already assembled—to advertise their company.

NBC may have been a business, but there is also a streak of genuine altruism that runs through the company’s papers. “Broadcasting is not a factory business,” wrote John Royal in an internal memo in 1940. “It does not make automobiles, plows or patent medicines. It is an inspirational, imaginative art.” Executives at NBC and CBS may have found ways to make money hand over fist even while the rest of the nation suffered the economic catastrophe of the 1930’s, but they also knew service to the nation was critical to their continuing success. And we must not ignore the sense of apprehension over the perceived threats to Latin America. In early 1939, the head of NBC’s department of
religious education, Rev. Maurice Sheehy, visited South America to make some broadcasts and returned alarmed about the Nazi presence there. “The South American radio situation calls for immediate and drastic action if we are to offset Nazi propaganda over the air,” he wrote to NBC’s director of educational programs. Sending the NBC Symphony to South America was a sensible way to contribute to the perceived needs of the nation while keeping an eye on potential benefits to the company.

Nevertheless, we cannot escape the question of cultural imperialism, raised at the start of this article. Throughout history, U.S. relations with Latin America have revolved around the issue of U.S. dominance in one form or another. How does the NBC Symphony tour—and the other musical exchanges of this era—fit into this scheme? Without question, sending Toscanini and the NBC Symphony to South America at this particular time was a political gesture. From the perspective of the network, the gesture was purely anti-fascist, but no political statement simply opposes; implicit in the statement is the promulgation of U.S. political interests. In this case, as in many others in the history of U.S.-Latin-American relations, U.S. political interests were inseparable from its business interests. Toscanini may not have performed any American music on the tour, but he traveled around in a General Motors car and, in effect, advertised the products of a U.S. record company, RCA-Victor.

Perhaps the best way to sort out this complex issue is to examine the way the South American people perceived the tour in 1940. At the same time as they greeted Hollywood’s “Good Neighbor” films with derision, South American audiences received the NBC Symphony tour with great enthusiasm and warmth. More than cultural imperialism, this tour illustrates what happens when business interests become too intertwined with the arts. Even though NBC displayed hints of altruism by sending the orchestra on tour at a (modest) financial loss, the fierce competitiveness with which the network’s executives organized the tour was more appropriate for the ruthless U.S. broadcasting environment than for a gesture of goodwill.
Endnotes:


5 “Toscanini Orchestra Delayed in Sailing,” *New York Times*, June 1, 1940, 12.


See especially Horowitz, *Understanding Toscanini*.


Sharrow interview.

Royal to Fioro Ugarte, and Royal to C. Grassi Diaz, Administrador General, Teatro Colón, Buenos Aires, July 27, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 46; Royal to Joseph Tushinsky, August 7, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 47; and Royal to Mullen, September 29, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 48.


Most of the note is reprinted in Marek, 230.

Royal to Trammel, re. Program Department Report for Board of Directors Meeting, July 26, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 46.

Ibid. Royal to Berkeley, May 1, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 45, and “Last Phase Begun.”

“Last Phase Begun.”


Memo from John Royal to Dr. L. S. Rowe, Director General, Pan American Union, Washington, D. C., February 9, 1937, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 9.

“U.S. Networks to Shower Programs on Latin America,” *Newsweek*, December 2, 1940, 51–52.


“Latin Serenade,” 32, 34; Baird; “CBS to S.A,” *Newsweek*, June 1, 1942, 62.


Royal to Toscanini, July 26, 1940, NBC Archives, box 80, folder 100. By point of comparison, the 100 musicians in the orchestra were paid a total of $65,000 for the tour; the entire cost of the tour, exclusive of Toscanini’s salary, was just $115,000 (Royal to Charles H. Grasser, Companhia Radiotelegraphica Brasileira, Rio, May 28, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 45).


Royal to Grasser, May 21, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 45.
Royal to Paul Willard Garrett, General Motors Corporation, May 15, 1940; and Royal to George P Harrington, Director General, General Motors do Brasil (São Paulo), August 1, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folders 45 and 47.

Royal to Lee, May 10, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 45; Royal to Lee, April 30, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 44.

“Two Maestros Vie for Symphony Tour,” *New York Times*, February 14, 1940, 23.

Albert V. Moore, president, Moore-McCormack, to Michael Myerberg, April 22, 1940, NBC Archives, box 80, folder 75.

Royal to Ugarte, April 27, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 45.

Royal to Ugarte, May 30, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 45.

Royal to Frank Mullen, September 29, 1940, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 48.

Royal to Frank Russell, December 3, 1939, NBC Archives, box 108, folder 40.

“Two Maestros Vie.”

“Toscanini Tour Irks Sponsor,” *New York Times*, April 20, 1940, 19. As it turned out, Stokowski only programmed a handful of novelty items written by American composers on his tour.


C. Grassi Diaz to Royal, September 11, 1940, NBC Archives, box 80, folder 75.

RCA Victor Argentia to Royal, August 24, 1940, NBC Archives, box 80, folder 75.

The “misinformation”—that he was born in 1882 rather than 1886, and that his name originally was Stokes rather than Stokowski—was in fact accurate, but did not correspond to Stokowski’s embellished version of his life story.

See, for example, Lisa M. Peppercorn, “Stokowski and Orchestra in Brazil,” *New York Times*, September 1, 1940, sec. 9, p. 6 and “Youth Orchestra Cheered in Brazil,” *New York Times*, August 8, 1940, p. 18, col. 3.


See the documentary *Carmen Miranda: Bananas is My Business*, directed by Helena Solberg and David Meyer (International Cinema, Inc., 1994).

Woll, 33–34.

“Defense Post Goes to N. Rockefeller,” *New York Times*, August 17, 1940, 6. Rockefeller, son of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., went on to become Governor of New York (1959–1973) and Vice President of the United States under Gerald Ford (1974–1977). It has been suggested that Rockefeller was actually sympathetic to the Nazis, and actually maintained friendly business ties with Nazi-controlled newspapers and corporations at the same time he was charged with the mission to counteract the Nazi presence in Latin America. See Charles Higham, *Orson Welles: The Rise and Fall of an American Genius* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1985), 180.

Smith, 83–84. For example, the CIAA opposed the distribution of *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*, starring Jimmy Stewart, because it was thought to be too critical of U.S. politics.


Marc Eliot, *Walt Disney: Hollywood’s Dark Prince* (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1993), 148–50; 179–81. Disney was, like Rockefeller, at least somewhat sympathetic to the Nazi cause. In the 1950s he would become Hollywood’s leading anti-Communist crusader and a secret agent for the FBI; see Eliot, 169–70.

Woll, 65.


Pike, 231.


Frye, 130.

Ibid., 192–93; 190.

Pike, 11, 61–68.


Royal to Niles Trammell, “re. Blue Separation,” 4 and 12, March 1940, NBC Archives, box 74, folder 79.